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THE STATE'S GUARANTEE
OF LIBERTYA Moral Evaluationt
REV. WILLIAM F. CAHILL*

T

HE GUARANTEE to be evaluated may be described in a few words.

The state pledges, by its internal law or by treaty, that it will
protect persons within its jurisdiction against molestation in the exercise
of their religious and ethical beliefs, and that this exercise, as such,
will not deprive them of any benefit provided by the state's laws. The
pledge is, of course, limited by operation of laws that safeguard the
peace of the state and security of its residents.
Our evaluation will be made by inquiring into the moral object, intent
and effects of the acts by which the state gives and implements the
guarantee. If the state, or at least its chief organ, be an individual
prince, no one but a Machiavellian will question this approach to our
task. Certainly the man whose political power is absolute is still a man,
obliged by his human nature and God's will to know the relation of his
every concrete act to his ultimate end, and to choose in each such act
means that will lead him to that end. When a prince pledges toleration,
his act has a dual impact upon the moral order. As a concrete human
act, it is either an act of sin or an act of virtue, according as it impedes
or advances the prince's progress to moral perfection and salvation. But
because his act makes law, it also affects his moral rights and the moral
obligations of his subjects. His act has this second effect by expanding
the subject matter of his rights and the content of his subjects' obligations. Assuming, of course, that the prince's pledge is a morally valid
exercise of political power, his subjects are now obliged, though they
were not before, to forbear the use of private or public force to coerce
others in the exercise of their ethical and religious beliefs. The prince
has a new moral right, which his subjects violate if they use the coercion he has forbidden.
t Paper read at the annual meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America
held in Ottawa in June 1961. Subsequently published in Vol. 16-1962 of the
Proceedings of the Society.
* B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.; Priest of the Diocese of Albany; former editor of The
CatholicLawyer.
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The state which is not, and whose principal organ is not, a physical person has no
personal end of moral perfection and no
destiny of personal fruition in God. Unlike
their citizens, officials, stockholders, directors, members and leaders, the United
States of America, the General Motors
Corporation and the United Mine Workers
are not destined to heaven or even to
limbo nor, by the same token, are they
in danger of hell. Having no human personality, the state which is a moral entity is not
capable of those personal acts of knowing
and willing which incur the guilt of sin, or
perfect virtue, and achieve grace and merit.
The pledge of toleration given by such a
state has not the primary impact of fault or
virtue in the moral order. Nevertheless, the
state, like the corporation and the voluntary association, does effect the second
impact upon the moral order - its impersonal acts alter the complex of rights and
duties in which men live, by affecting the
material subjected to those rights and
duties. That material may be a line of
social conduct, a period of labor, a check,
an automobile, or a piece of real estate.
General Motors can, by an act of sale, give
me moral title to a car, so that it is my
car and no one can take it from me without doing a moral wrong which violates my
moral rights. There should be no difficulty
in seeing that the United States can morally oblige me not to put my hand over
the mouth of a canting Jehovah Witness,
though I might have done so without moral
fault if the law had not forbidden it. One
supposes, of course, that the act of sale and
the act of lawmaking have the qualities
needed to make them effective in the objective order of morals.'
1 See Bortolotti, Obligationis Status Veram Relig-

ionem Profitendi Praemissae et Limites, 48 PE-

Our principal purpose in attempting a
moral evaluation of the state's guarantee of
toleration is to determine whether and
when the state's act has the effect of creating moral rights and duties. This evaluation
will, of course, be a necessary premise in
any judgment upon the acts by which an
individual man exercises his human faculties either alone or in conjunction with the
powers he enjoys in his political system,
to advance or impede, implement or violate, the pledge of his state to protect the
exercise of belief. This paper will discuss
the moral quality of the state's guarantee,
without attempting the broader task of
judging the conduct of individual persons.
The Moral Object of the Guarantee
The object of the guarantee is quite
distinct from the object of the acts by
which religious and ethical belief is exercised. The moral object of the believer's act
is good or evil as his practical judgment,
premised on his belief and implemented
in his exercise of belief, is a true or a
false reflection of the theological, ontological and moral orders. If that practical
judgment is erroneous, representing as permissible or mandatory an act which is evil
in its object, the objective moral order is violated no less than if the believer had acted
contrary to a correct practical judgment.
Human sacrifice is, in its object, murderous
and blasphemous. To advocate atheism or
free love, even when one is motivated by
a horror of superstition and hypocrisy, is
to attempt to turn the minds and wills of
one's hearers away from God Himself,
or from the kind of love God imposes
mandatorily upon His human creatures.
On the other hand, the act by which
298, 303-05 \Rome, 1959)
cited as Bortolotti].
RIODICA

[hereinafter

8

the state protects some murderers and some
advocates of atheism and free love from
punishment and molestation, does not have
murder or atheism or free love for its
object. The object of this act is to forbear
punishing, or to save from molestation, a
person whom the state is able, physically
and morally, to punish or to leave open
to molestation. This object is dissonant
from the moral order if a moral principle
or precept requires, unconditionally, that
the state shall punish and shall refuse protection to all wrongdoers. It is submitted
that the object of the state's guarantee of
religious and ethical toleration is not evil
per se nor by reason of divine precept.
The act of toleration differs, again, from
an act which purports to give a moral right1
to teach error or to do evil. 2 A moral right
is a faculty, valid in the realm of morals,
to act in a certain way. When the act is
external, the right imports a moral claim
upon the aid or forbearance of others. The
moral right and its concomitant claim are
always premised upon the mind and will
of God Who is author of the moral order.
God Himself cannot command or authorize
a man to act in violation of that moral
human nature which, in its essential addiction to truth and goodness, is God's own
image. The nature of man prevents his
receiving from anyone a right to do evil.
God Himself cannot give a moral right to
teach falsehood or to do evil. The nature
of the state's authority over human conduct, as a sharing in and a derivative from
God's authority, prevents the state from
3
conferring such a right.
2 See Boucher, Liberte Morale, DICTIONNAIRE DE
THEOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE 9:col. 701 [hereinafter
cited as Boucher].
3 See Pius XII, Allocutio iis qui interlueruntConventui quinto nationaliItalico Unionis lureconsul-
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An act of toleration which purports to
confer or protect a right to teach error or
to do evil, has an object which is evil per
se. Pope Leo XIII taught that a state
guarantee of total religious liberty as a
4
gift of nature is never morally right.
Father John Courtney Murray points
out that some of Our American contemporaries advocate this kind of guarantee, and
profess to find it imposed upon all Americans, as an "agreement on ultimates," by
the federal constitution. 5 The Protestant.
thesis asserts that the first amendment's
religious liberty clause imports the doctrine
that individual conscience is the absolute
voice of God, not answerable to any external norm of good and evil. The secularist
thesis similarly maintains that the clause
has a dogmatic sense, and that the doctrine
imposed by the clause is either absolute
or agnostic moral and religious indifferentism. These doctrines are, in sum, that
there are no moral or religious absolutes, or
no knowable ones, because if there be any
divine order for human life we cannot know
it by scientifically empirical methods, and
metaphysical reflection has no validity. 6
Father Murray shows clearly that the
clause, in our history and in our present
social reality, has no such import. Rather,
it is an "article of peace," a guarantee of
free exercise which makes no doctrinaire
torum catholicorum, habita 6 Dec., 1953, ACTA
APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 45:794, 798 [hereinafter cited
as Pius XII, Allocutio]. For English translation
see 52 CATHOLIC MIND 244 (1954).
4 Leo XIII, Litt. Encycl. Libertas, 20 Jun. 1888,
GASPARRI, CODICIS ILRIS CANONICI FONTES 3:295,

310; N. 600, § 30.
5 MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 51 (New
York, 1960) [hereinafter cited as MURRAY]. See
also Father Murray's essay in A Church-State
Anthology (Yanitelli ed.), 27 THOUGHT 6 (1952)
and Father Gustave Weigel's, The Church and the
Democratic State, 27 THOUGHT 161 (1952).
6 MURRAY 51.
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assertion that total religious liberty is man's
7
endowment, either by nature or by grace.
The clause is not now, and never was, an
"agreement on ultimates;" it is "an agreement on the good of man at the level of
performance."s
Father Bortolotti has found it necessary
to refute a distortion of Pope Leo's doctrine
on the guarantee of religious liberty. In
his study of the obligation of states to
profess religious truth, he points out that
there is no logical inconsistency between
a state's profession of true religion and its
simultaneous grant of entire freedom to
propagate false religions and to exercise
their public worship. 9 He does not advocate
such a grant. He holds that a state which
professes Catholicism must protect the
Church against the unjust aggressions of
false propaganda, when the Church asks
for such protection. But he expressly rejects
the notion that the state's profession of
Catholicism directly obliges it to refuse
all toleration. 10 This very wise man restricts his discussion of toleration to a
single aspect of "this complex and rugged
question," but he says enough to indicate
that toleration which imports only an agreement on the good of man at the level
of performance has not a moral object
which is evil per se.
Pope Pius XII taught that the practice
of toleration - the forbearance of the state
to impede violations of religious truth and
moral law, when the means of impeding
those things are at hand- is not an evil
in se, because God Who holds the world
in His hand does not violate His own
holiness by such forbearance. Nor, said
7 MURRAY 57-63.
8 MURRAY 54.

9 Bortolotti 317.
10 Bortolotti 318.

the Pope, has God given to any human
power a command, absolute and universal,
to impede all trespasses upon the truths
of faith or upon good morals.'1
Our thesis, that the state's guarantee
of toleration is not evil in its moral object,
is clearly implied in these conclusions of
Pope Pius XII: "The duty to repress moral
and religious deviations cannot be, therefore, an ultimate norm of action. This
(duty) must be subordinated to higher and
moral general norms ...."12 But the duty
to repress evil would be an ultimate norm
of action, and would be subject to no
higher norm, if the act of tolerating evil
by giving to evildoers legal protections and
immunities were wrongful in its very object.
The Pope, in developing these conclusions, refers to the parable of the wheat and
the cockle 13 as one of many scriptural
passages which show that toleration of evil
is not evil in its object. This parable seems
particularly apposite to our problem. The
parable teaches that an immunity from
punishment or molestation can be conferred
upon evildoers by an authority which imposes upon other men a moral duty not
to molest the wrongdoers and to leave them
in the enjoyment of the common goods of
human life. If the parable does not teach
this, then one would have to say that the
servants who found the cockle were morally
free to disobey their master, to gather the
cockle though in doing so they uprooted
the wheat. The parable was addressed
directly to the Apostles, and seems quite
clearly to be intended as a norm of action
for the Church. If the Church, whose very
mission is the preservation of truth and
the salvation of souls, may follow the
11 Pius X1I, Allocutio 799.
12 Ibid.
1" MATT. 13:24-30.

8
householder as an exemplar of prudence,
why may not the state also imitate him?
It may seem to some that the guarantees
we have described are broader than those
Pope Pius contemplated in his allocution,
and that our vindication of the broader
guarantees is not warranted by our premises. The subjec.t of the Pope's address was
a treaty which would assure to all citizens
of a number of associated states the guarantee of freedom to exercise their beliefs in
the territory of any of the member states.
He answered negatively this specific question: Is it absolutely wrong for a Catholic
state, as a member of the association, to
adhere to the treaty which will give this
guarantee for exercise in its territory of
any and all religious beliefs admitted by
14
the other associated states?
The Pope's remarks do not advert to
the question of an internal law of a
Catholic state which would give the same
guarantee to its citizens as the treaty would
give to aliens sojourning within its borders.
But the direct moral object of the treaty
and of the law are the same. Clearly, if
the treaty is not evil, either in se or by
divine precept, then the law is not evil in
its object.
Again, the Pope speaks explicitly only
of immunity of friendly aliens from coercion by the laws of the state which is
their host. He does not mention a guarantee
that the host state's laws will protect the
aliens from molestation by private persons.
But to grant to either aliens or citizens an
immunity from legal action, without protecting them from molestation by those
who are not state agents, would be an
absurd and provocative invitation to violence and disorder. So the Pope's moral
14 Pius XII, Allocutio 797.
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judgment, or at least its premises, seems
to support the conclusion that the broader
guarantee here described is not wrongful in
its moral object.
I believe we should at this point show,
at least summarily, that traditional Catholic
theology does not insist that state toleration is an evil in se or by reason of divine
precept. For this purpose, it may suffice
to point out some of the teachings of St.
Thomas on the duty of states to impede
error and evil.
The premise which underlies all of St.
Thomas' doctrine on this matter is that
human authority, because it derives from
the power of God, should imitate God in
the use of power. Particularly, human
authority should learn of God to tolerate
evil. God, though almighty and supremely
good, permits evil happenings which He
could prevent, lest through the removal of
them greater goods should be lost or
greater evils should follow. 15
Jews and pagans who have never accepted the Christian Faith should not be
coerced in any way to profess it.' 6 Thomas
sees a positive good resulting from toleration of the Jewish ritual. The beliefs of
the Jews reflect the historical and prophetic
background of the Christian Faith. Their
ritual is a witness, more effective because
an unfriendly witness, to the truth of
Christianity, and it teaches Christians some
7
of the truths of their own Faith.'
On the contrary, there is no affirmative
good resulting to the Church from the
toleration of heretics which can offset the
grave harm threatened by the dissidents'
intent to corrupt the faith of the members
15 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 2-2, 10, 11, c. [hereinafter
cited as SUMMA, with indication of Part, Question,
Article, place in the Article.]
16 SUMMA, 2-2, 10, 8, ad 2.
17 Ibid.
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of the Church. 18
Thomas adverts to the etymology of the
term heresy. It derives from the Greek
word for choice and imports that every
man shall and may choose whatever teaching he thinks best.' 0 A heretic is a Christian
who rejects a doctrine of Christ and
chooses in its stead a doctrine which
pleases him, for reasons of profit, power
or prestige,20 or because the doctrine ap21
peals to his carnal fancy.
It is the intent of heretics to corrupt
the Christian Faith. 22 Certainly the Church
must excommunicate them, lest they succeed in that intent, and the Church may
permit the state to put them to death, for
the same defensive purpose. 23 The threat of
death is not made against them in order
to bring the heretics to salvation, for no
one can be forced into union with Christ.
Death is inflicted, and justly, to punish men
who have broken the pledge they made to
hold the Faith when they accepted it, and
the threat of death is made in order to
compel performance of that pledge by those
whose stand in the Faith is weakened by
the carnal attractions that draw men to

heresy.

24

Yet Thomas teaches that there are reasons sufficient for the Church to save even
the most pertinacious heretics from death
and other harms of the temporal order.
The most cogent reason is to avoid a
schism in the Church, caused by those who
sympathize with the heretics. 25 The Church
has, in fact, permitted the Pelagians and
18 SUMMA,

2-2, 11, 3, ad 2.
1, arg. 1.
2-2, 11, 1, arg. 2 and c.
2-2, 11, 1, ad 3.
2-2, 11, 3, ad 2.
2-2, 11, 3, ad 3.
2-2, 10, 8, tot. art.
2-2, 10, 8, ad 1.

19 SUMMA, 2-2, 11,

20
21
22
23
24
25

SUMMA,
SUMMA,
SUMMA,
SUMMA,
SUMMA,
SUMMA,

other heretics to practice their beliefs in
order, as Thomas says, to avoid scandal.
The scandal might be suffered by true believers, by reason of the quarreling that
intolerance would cause, or it might be
suffered by the heretics and other unbelievers whose gradual and sincere conversion might be jeopardized by the refusal
of toleration. 2 6 One should note that this

toleration in temporal matters does not
import relaxation of excommunication of
heretics.
Thomas says that the "perfidious apostates," those who once held the Christian
Faith but now reject all faith in God, are
in far worse case as regards salvation than
the pagans, Jews or even heretics. 27 He
considers the menace offered to the Chris-

tian community by apostate rulers, 28 but
he does not exclude apostates from the
toleration he declares may be given to
29

unbelievers generally.
In all this, Thomas does not consider
directly the rights and duties of the state in
respect of tolerating or repressing unbelief.
His remarks on the death sentence for
heretics imply that this can be justly inflicted by the state, but all the evils and
goods he balances in this discussion are
things which affect the Church or the
salvation of individuals. Yet he must have
intended that the state, as a human authority, should learn of God to tolerate evil
for the sake of securing a greater good
or forfending a greater evil. And he must
be taken to imply that goods and evils
which affect the temporal common weal,
which is the charge of the state, should be
weighed in the balance with the spiritual
26 SUMMA, 2-2, 10, 11, c.
27 SUMMA, 2-2, 12, 1, c.
28 SUMMA, 2-2, 12, 2, tot. art.
29 SUMMA, 2-2, 10, 11, tot. art.
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goods and evils he enumerates as objects
of the Church's immediate concern.
Vitoria, the great theologian and jurist,
considers the application of St. Thomas'
doctrine by a Christian prince who rules
unbelievers. He argues that when the prince
has undertaken to rule the pagans upon
a stipulation that he will permit them to
retain their ritual, then he cannot coerce
them in these matters, "for in this they
are not his subjects, since he has no power
but what they gave him."' 30 Vitoria insists
that no Christian prince has power to impose higher taxes or diminish the liberties
of his pagan subjects in comparison to his
Christian subjects, for he has no more
power over one that over the other. The
Christian must rule a pagan country so
that its material resources are conserved
and increased, and not despoiled, 3 1 nor
should he deny the right of coinage if the
prosperity of the country demands it.32
The Moral Intent of the Guarantee
Every human act, precisely because it is
human, proceeds from a deliberate will.
The will always takes its direction from
a final purpose or end. The end is so called
because it is the first in the series of
causes that bring a man to act. It is first
for the reason that if the man who is about
to act knows that the end cannot be
33
achieved, he will not act.
Though the will-act of a moral person
has not the psychological process which we
call intent in the act of a physical person,
30 VITORIA, De La Templanza, Fragment, IX Conclusion, OBRAS DE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 1053-54

(Madrid, 1960) [hereinafter cited as VrrORIA,
with reference to textual division and to this
edition's pagination].
31 VITORIA,
32 VITORIA,

X and XI Conclusions, 1054-55.
X1I Conclusion, 1055.

33 SUMMA,

1-2,

1, 3, c.
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yet the moral person's act has intent
analogically and juridically. A corporation
can give a deed which is absolute on its
face, but the deed will operate in law as
a trust or a mortgage if the court finds that
the corporation intended the transfer in
trust or to secure a debt. The legal and
moral rights of the corporation and of its
grantee, and even those of third persons,
are different in each of the three cases.
Similarly, the acts of democratic and
other corporate governments may be said
to have intents which have effect in the
juridical and moral orders. We are all
familiar with the effect of a legislature's
intent upon the rights and duties of persons
subject to its laws.
We should remember that the law's intent is the intent of the law- the intent
of the state or its lawmaking organ, expressed or implied in the official action by
which the law is made. One cannot attribute to the state or to its law every purpose
for which individuals have advocated the
law or voted for it, or now execute it or
take advantage of it. A law may be unexceptionable in its legal intent, though
many or even most of the citizens or
officials of the state support it or employ
it for evil purposes. The existence of such
evil private intents may very well raise
a proper question concerning the moral
value of the law's effects, but that is a
question quite distinct from the question
of the law's intent which concerns us here.
It is not necessary to imagine a case
in which the legal guarantee of religious
liberty was given with morally evil intent.
Pius IX describes the enactments of the
Mexican revolutionary regime of the
1850's. 3 4 He says that freedom of expresIX, Allocutio, Namquam fore 15 Dec.
1856, GASPARRI. C.I.C. FONTES 2: 913; N. 522,
§4.
34Pius
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sion was guaranteed by law for three purposes: to corrupt the people's minds and
morals, to further indifferentism, and to
root out the Catholic religion. Aside from
any explicit declaration of the "legislative
intent," his judgment is supported by the
fact that the same set of laws expressly
forbade anyone to assume any religious
obligation, by contract, promise or vow.
It was from this allocution on the Mexican
laws that the Syllabus of 1864 drew its
seventy-ninth proposition, which we will
35
discuss later.
When, in fact, a state guarantee of freedom to exercise religious and moral belief
is endowed of an evil intent, that intent
certainly affects the law's impact upon the
moral order. And the moral impact of a
law whose intent alone is evil differs from
the impact of a law whose very object is
evil. A law whose object is to establish a
right to do moral wrong is an attempt
to do the impossible, as has been shown
in the previous section. Such a law is a
nullity in the moral order - it cannot create
moral rights or obligations in anyone. This
kind of law is exemplified in the Mexican
enactment forbidding the assumption of
religious obligations. On the other hand, a
law whose object is not evil in se but whose
intent is to accomplish moral evil, such as
the perversion of men's consciences in the
Mexican example, does not, for that reason
alone, fail to create moral rights and duties.
For example, I do not think that a
firstborn son would do his brothers and
sisters an injustice by taking his father's
entire estate under a rule of primogeniture,
simply because. the rule had been introduced into the law with evil intent. Suppose

35 Pius IX, Syllabus Errorum (a. 1864),
PARRI, C.I.C. FONTES 2: 1009; N. 543, § X.

GAs-

that the rule were made as part of a scheme
of family law whose design was to encourage the use of contraception. The object of the rule - to pass the estate to the
firstborn son- is not evil in se, and the
rule may, in given social circumstances,
have an actual effect in which good outweighs evil.
In the area of toleration, however, I
believe it is very difficult to postulate a
concrete situation in which the law's intent
to accomplish an evil purpose would not
cause the object of the law to be so formulated that the object itself would be evil,
or would not cause the law's operation
to yield effects which would, on balance,
weigh well on the side of evil. Certainly
the Mexican government's intent to destroy
religion inspired it to embrace the legislative object of conferring an unlimited right
to express erroneous opinions. As to the
effects of the government's conduct, even a
century later any serious student of Mexican life must conclude that religious belief
in that people has been weakened more
by the law's attitude of contempt for religion than by its actual persecutions.
It hardly needs to be said that the principles governing formal and material cooperation must be applied in evaluating the
acts of citizens and officials of a state
where toleration is proposed or has been
enacted for an evil purpose.
The Moral Effects of the Guarantee
In the circumstances of the politically
free and mature nations of our time, one
is not likely to encounter laws of toleration
which can be categorized as evil in their
object or in their juridical intent. The
moral impact of these guarantees must be
evaluated chiefly from their moral effects.
The test here may be put as a question:

8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

Is the legal quarantee justified in the interest of a higher and broader good? That last
phrase, "justified in the interest of a higher
and broader good," is the language of Pius
XII.3 6 He was at pains to follow it immediately with a declaration that the question of justification for a law or a treaty
guaranteeing toleration is a question of
fact, to be decided in the concrete case.
In the process of decision he describes,
the very first consideration is that of "the
harmful consequences of toleration." In his
statements that toleration needs to be
justified, and that in doing so its harmful
effects may never be passed over, I think
we may see implied two judgments which
serve to guide this discussion. Toleration,
since it needs the justification of a higher
and greater good, is certainly not a good
in se. For the same reason, and because
attention must always be given to toleration's harmful effects, it must be that harmful effects are produced by toleration in
the strict sense of being caused thereby, and
not merely in the broad sense in which
effects are attributed to an act which only
occasions them. These two judgments, I
believe, hark back to the seventy-ninth
proposition of the Syllabus of Errors. Pius
IX said that civil liberty of worship for
everyone, and full civil authorization given
all men openly and publicly to set forth all
opinions and ideas, tend readily to the
corruption of the minds and morals of peoples, and to the spread of the plague of
indifferentism. 7 A century after the SyllaPius XII, Allocutio 799.
Tpius IX, loc. cit. supra note 35:

36

"Enimvero
falsum est, civilem cuiusque cultus libertatem,
itemque plenam potestatem omnibus attributam
quaslibet opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi conducere ad populorum
1

mores animosque facilius corrumpendos ac indifferentismi pestem propagandam."

1962

bus, civil liberty of belief still serves the
purpose of dogmatic indifferentism. The
recent pastoral letter of the Bishops of Italy
describes the thesis of the atheistic humanists and shows clearly how that thesis is
imp'emented in their country. Religious
principle and practice are purely private
matters - the life and activity of civil society has no place for them. Therefore the
humanist educators, sociologists and politicians protest and contest every application
of religious values in public affairs, and try
to -eliminate every juridical basis for such
38
application.
I believe, therefore, that it would be
inadmissible for a Catholic, in discussing
civil toleration, to accept the premise that
the guarantee of freedom in the practice of
all religious and ethical beliefs is a good
in itself, or that the guarantee is only a
remote and relative, rather than proximate
and absolute, occasion of evil. To accept
st'ch a proposition might import a departure from papal teaching and from a
prime premise of all Catholic thought on
the problem of toleration. No servant of
Christ's household, though he forbears to
root out the cockle of error, can blink the
fact that cockle allowed to grow in a wheat
field harms the wheat. Alternatively, a
Catholic's acceptance of such a premise
would seem to involve him, conscious or
not, in dishonesty, moral or intellectual.
I advert to this aspect of our problem,
not because I know any Catholic writer
who has accepted the objectionable premise, but because some secular writers and
their readers seem to have taken the impression that the Church, or the late Pope,
38The text of the letter, titled L'Atteggiamento
della Chiesa di Fronte al Fenomeno del Laicismo,
and dated 25 March 1960, is offered in 7 MONITOR ECCLESIASTICUS 577 (Rome, 1960).
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or some Catholic publicists, have come to
view toleration as a good in itself.
What Father Murray has said about the
consent given by Catholics to the first
amendment as an "article of peace," 39 states
well the Catholic moral evaluation of any
guarantee that falls within the description
set out at the beginning of this paper. Guarantees of this sort have their origins in
moral principle and impose moral obligations when, in the concrete case, they are
for the common good.
An enactment of the sort described is
for the common good when, in the particular case examined, 40 the law of toleration brings to the community good effects
greater and higher than the good lost
through the erroneous propaganda and evil
practice which the law permits. According
to Pope Pius XII, the weight of the good
effect, as against that of the evil, may be
so great that the state has no duty, and even
41
no right, to deny toleration.
One should note that the good effects
which can justify the act of toleration
despite the evil the act occasions are the
effects of the act of toleration itself; there
is no question of seeking to throw into the
moral balance any good effect which erroneous teaching or evil conduct may
produce.
What sort of good effects can free the
state of any duty to impede evil, or even
deprive it of any right to do so? Pope Pius
mentioned those goods directly pertinent
to the supranational community to whose
formation the treaty he examined was
directed. He spoke of peace and the realization of the human faith in a higher com39 MURRAY 63.
40 Pius XII, Allocutio 798: "in determinate cir-

costanze."
41 Id. at 798-99.

munity of men, willed by their Creator,
rooted in their common origin, nature and
last end. 4 2 Surely, the achievement of peace
and union within the existing national states
is a great good in respect of those states.
Indeed, in the given circumstances of a
national state, the achievement and consolidation of these goods may require toleration as necessarily as in the international
community, or perhaps more so.
St. Thomas dignified as "secundum se
bonum" the public peace of a country. The
peace has that dignity- it is not merely
useful , because many more men will use
it for good purposes than for evil. It gives
security against evils far worse than those
perpetrated under its protection, so that
it does not become evil when some use
43
it for evil purposes.
Of course peace in its most proper sense
is in the individual whose heart is at one with
itself. Peace in the larger sense - the union
of wills among a number of men - is properly called concord, and civil peace is of
this kind. 44 But even peace in this larger
sense is the product of charity, in which
we love our neighbors as ourselves, desiring
45
what they desire.
Men's faith in the human community,
national or supranational, cannot be realized without charity to their fellows.
Against any good achieved by state action
repressing the exercise of erroneous belief,
must be weighed the effect of this repression upon that charity without which the
peace and unity of the community cannot
flourish. Even when an evildoer acts from
conviction, it is difficult for those who use
his action as a premise for punishing him
42
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or depriving him of some share in the common goods of life to wish him well. On the
other hand, it is almost impossible for him
under the limitations of human psychology,
to desire the welfare and happiness of his
just oppressors.
Pope Pius notes some human tendencies
which work against peace and union on
the supranational level. These have the
same effect within nations, and the effect
is intensified where the population is diversified by racial, cultural and religious
differences. There is the tendency to assimilate or to remove, even by force, those who
differ from the group, and there is a contrary tendency in each group to close and
segregate itself, refusing to give anything of
46
itself to outsiders.
The Pope states a fundamental principle
for dealing with these tendencies. Within
the limits of the possible and lawful, everything that makes union more easy and
efficacious must be done. All that disturbs
concord must be restrained. Sometimes
what cannot be corrected must be borne,
more than that, it must not be permitted
to wreck the community, for the com47
munity serves a higher good.
His Holiness remarked that the real
difficulty lies in applying that principle. We
owe much to Father Murray for his excellent exposition of how the authors of the
federal constitution made that application
in a country whose population was frag48
mented by deep religious differences.
The Pope did not speak of another good
effect of legal guarantees of toleration
which has engaged the attention of many
Catholics in recent years. This is toleration's effect of attracting men to explore
46

and embrace the truth in religion and
ethics, by bringing to their attention the
appeal of truth itself to the human mind,
and its value as a guide to human happiness. By abhorring to use coercion in
matters of religious and ethical belief, it is
said that the state gives honor to three
truths whose recognition is invaluable to
human happiness. The truth itself has
power to engage the assent of honest minds.
Goodness itself attracts men's free allegiance. God's grace is the only outside influence properly effective within the citadel of
man's mind and will.
The state's effective acknowledgment of
these truths is a good in itself. The state's
employment of toleration is still not a good
in itself, but it is justified as a means of
making this profession, provided that this
and other good effects outweigh toleration's
tendency to confirm men in error or evil
doing. The scale which weighs toleration's
effects will indicate even greater justification, when the state's profession of these
truths causes individual men to recognize
and embrace the opportunities and duties
which nature and grace offer and impose.
We should note that ours is not the first
generation of Catholics to perceive these
good effects of toleration and to value them
highly. Vitoria, following St. Thomas and
Aristotle, held that a Christian prince
should repress human sacrifices and other
immoral practices which formed part of the
religious ritual of pagan people under his
rule. 49 He pointed out, however, that
though such repression is good in its object,
one must judge it by its effects in the concrete. He felt that to compel men by severe
penalties to abjure immediately and entirely
the customs of their ancestors was an
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insufferable oppression.5 ° Further, the good
object of the law would not save it from
giving great scandal if it actually or seemingly compelled men by force to become
Christians. Vitoria regarded as one of the
glories of Christianity, and a weighty argument for its truth, the fact that Christians
have always approached infidels with arguments of reason and the evidence of miracles rather than with force, and have never
compelled them to become Christians. 51
If one could be sure that coercion would
make sincere Christians, a coercive law
might be justified, but Vitoria believed that
repressive laws are much more likely to
arouse hatred for the true religion and thus
work against the common good which all
52
law should promote.
In his book on man and the state,
Maritain insists that a modem democratic
society inspired by Christianity must not
infringe the right of each citizen to dissent
from the faith held by his fellows, even
if he be utterly alone in his dissent. 5' Cardinal Lercaro's famous lecture demonstrated
that the Catholic doctrine of toleration has
not changed in principle, though its historical applications have varied. The variance,
as the Cardinal indicates, is proportioned
to the presence or absence of good faith
in unbelievers. When one rejects the truth
he knows, there is nothing in his act which
demands respect or motivates tolerance.
When, by the circumstances of history, dissent has become hereditary and is therefore
generally maintained in good faith, tolerance is demanded by the duty to respect
the human personality of the dissenter, by
the respect due to the nature of truth which

excludes its acceptance by force, and by
respect for the action of God in the souls
of men. 54 Assuming the same historical
postulate of good faith, Father Enda McDonagh of Maynooth shows that tolerance
is a necessary characteristic of the sincere
proponent of religious truth. Intolerance in
a Catholic so gravely and obviously violates
the virtues of justice, charity and humility,
that it obscures the evidence of the true
faith and confirms men in dissent. 55
57
Father Bortolotti5 6 and Father Hayoit
have given us explicit treatments of the
state's duty to profess philosophical and
religious truth. Of civil toleration, Father
Bortolotti says only that it is not incompatible with the state's profession of truth.
On reading Father Hayoit's later article, 5
one wonders if it may be suggested that
civil toleration is an apt means by which
the state, in pursuit of its teaching mission,
may profess the truths concerning man's
personal dignity and the workings of truth
and grace that have been cited by Cardinal
Lercaro. Alternatively or concommitantly,
is civil toleration to be urged as an exercise
of the law's role in the moral improvement
of its subjects? Good law, says St. Thomas,
59
leads men to virtue, at least gradually.
Conclusions
When this paper was proposed, I was
54 Lercaro, Tolleranza ed intolleranza religiosa,

69 IL Dmrrro ECCLESIASTICO 97-112 (Milan,
Aprile-Guigno 1958). See English reprint in 7
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(Maynooth, Jan. 1961).
56 Bortolotti, loc. cit. supra note 1.
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asked to offer in it an opinion regarding
the direction and scope of recent developments in Catholic thought on toleration.
Elements of that opinion have been expressed in the course of the paper. They
are summarized here.
There has been no real development in
the view that civil toleration is not evil in
its moral object, although the truth. of that
proposition has been clarified, especially by
Pope Pius XII's discourse. Our generation
cannot claim to have discovered the true
significance of the seventy-ninth proposition of the Syllabus of Pius IX, for that was
clearly set out in Father Boucher's D.T.C.
article on moral liberty, which was written
in the early twenties. 60
There has been offered in recent years
only one practical occasion for discussing
guarantees of toleration loaded with doctrinaire intent. That was afforded by the
litigation in the United States Supreme
Court of problems related chiefly to religious schools. Father Murray, following
Father Parsons, 61 has exonerated our
founding fathers from the allegation that
they perpetrated an atrocity of that kind in
the first amendment.
Most significant, I believe, has been
Pope Pius XII's lucid exposition of the
demands of peace and the development of
the world community as affirmative goods
of very high order which must, in present
circumstances, be secured through guarantees of toleration.
The kind of writing that Cardinal Lercaro, Father McDonagh and Father Hayoit
have given us will produce, I am sure, excellent effects. It will help to deepen the
charity of Catholics toward men who dif-
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fer from them on matters of religious or
ethical principle. At the same time, this
writing and its impact upon the Catholic
community will do much to spread among
non-catholics a better understanding of
truth in general and of Catholic doctrine,
and it will inspire and strengthen in them
a great good will toward their Catholic fellow citizens.
There is much force in the axiom that
men in society need truth more than they
need bread, yet from this it does not follow
that the law of the state can be as effective
in meeting the one need as in providing for
the other. I doubt seriously the effectiveness
of the state and its coercive laws to explain
and gain acceptance for the subtle truths
in which salvation has its root. Any direct
effort in this direction is better left to the
personal influence of good men inspired by
the Cardinal of Bologna and the Professor
of Maynooth. State guarantees of religious
and ethical liberty will- do well if they keep
the peace and avoid scandal, as the guarantees of Irish law certainly did during the
regime of the Free State and seem to have
done for over twenty years since they were
written into the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland. 62 If we may judge from recent attacks upon them and upon Father
McDonagh's defense of them, 63 it is to be
doubted that they are, in themselves, effective to teach high principles.
62 The guarantees are contained in the Constitution of Ireland, Art. 44, 2, 1 and 3'. They were
carried over from the law of the Free State, in
which regime their effect gave satisfaction to all
religious groups. See the debates on this Article,
June 4 and 9, 1937, in Dail Eireann Parliamentary
Debates, Official Report, 17: col. 1888-95; 18:
col. 229-35 (Dublin, 1937), and see BLANCHARD,
LE
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